In terms of monetary analysis, the starting date of 1973 has the disadvantage of missing the publication in 1968 and 1970 of the Andersen-Jordan (1968) and Andersen-Carlson (1970) studies, which many of you will know were written at the St. Louis Fed under the directorship of Homer Jones. These studies were to an extent a follow-up to the Friedman-Meiselman (1963) paper, which had set off a period of intellectual warfare between economists of a then-standard Keynesian persuasion and those who were shortly (Brunner, 1968) to be termed "monetarists."
1 But my reason for beginning slightly later is that the years 1971-1973 featured the publication of six papers that initiated the rational expectations revolution. The most celebrated of these is Lucas's (1972a) "Expectations and the neutrality of money," but his (1972b) and (1973) were also extremely influential as were Sargent's (1971) and (1973) . The sixth paper is Walters (1971) , which had little influence but was I believe the first publication to use rational expectations (RE) in a macro-monetary analysis.
At first there was much resistance to the RE hypothesis, partly because it was initially associated with the policy-ineffectiveness proposition. But it gradually swept the field in both macro and microeconomics, a major reason being that it seems extremely imprudent for policy analysis to be conducted under the assumption that any particular pattern of expectational errors will prevail in the future-and ruling out all such patterns implies RE.
There were other misconceptions regarding rational expectations, the most prominent of which was that Lucas's famous "critique" (1976) paper demonstrated that policy analysis with econometric models was a fundamentally flawed undertaking.
Actually, of course, Lucas and Sargent showed instead that certain techniques were 1 Initially, I was not an admirer of the Andersen-Jordan study, but later my evaluation jumped up considerably, as can be seen from McCallum (1986) . Right from the start, however, I was one of the many analysts who were stimulated into active research in the area by that paper's bold and innovative use of statistical tools to examine basic issues relating to monetary policy. led to a long period during which there was a great falling off in the volume of sophisticated yet practical monetary policy analysis.
One reason was the upsurge of the real-business-cycle (RBC) approach to macroeconomic analysis, which in its standard version assumes that price adjustments take place so quickly that, for practical purposes, there is continuous market-clearing for all commodities, including labor. In this case, monetary policy actions will in most models have little or no effect on real macroeconomic variables at cyclical frequencies.
Of course this has been a highly controversial hypothesis and I am on record as finding it quite dubious (McCallum, 1989) . But my attitude is not altogether negative about RBC analysis because much of it has been devoted to the development of new theoretical and empirical tools, ones that can be employed without any necessary acceptance of the RBC hypothesis about the source of cyclical fluctuations.
In recent years, in fact, these tools have been applied in a highly promising fashion. Thus a major movement has been underway to construct, estimate, and simulate monetary models in which the economic actors are depicted as solving dynamic optimization problems and then interacting on competitive markets, 3 as in the RBC literature, but with some form of nominal price and/or wage "stickiness" built into the structure. The match between these models and actual data is then investigated, often by standard RBC procedures, for both real and monetary variables and their interactions. But to get the full flavor of the extent to which central-bank and academic monetary analysis has done away with distinctions that were important only recently, one needs to read the papers. It is my impression that if the authors' names were removed, one would find it extremely difficult to tell which group the author or authors came from.
To me this intense interaction seems to represent a very positive change, and is one toward which several regional Federal Reserve Banks (including St. Louis) have contributed greatly.
In the research at these two conferences there was not just a similarity of technique across groups, but also a considerable amount of agreement across authors about the outline of an appropriate framework for the analysis of monetary policy issues.
Such agreement can be dangerous, of course, but it certainly facilitates communication.
And in fact there remains room for quite a bit of substantive disagreement within the framework so on balance I find this similarity somewhat encouraging. In any event, I
would like to describe this framework and then take up some major issues that I hope you will find interesting.
The nearly standard framework at the NBER and Riksbank conferences is a quantitative macroeconomic model that includes three main components. These are (i)
an IS-type relation (or set of relations) that specifies how interest-rate movements affect aggregate demand and output; (ii) a price adjustment equation (or set of equations) that specifies how inflation behaves in response to the output gap and to expectations regarding future inflation; and (iii) a monetary policy rule that specifies each period's settings of an interest-rate instrument. These settings are typically made in response to recent or predicted values of the economy's inflation rate and its output gap. A leading example of such a rule will be considered at length shortly. Most of these are quarterly models and most incorporate rational expectations. They are estimated by various methods, including the approach called "calibration," but in all cases an attempt is made to produce a quantitative model in which parameter values are consistent with actual time-series data for the U.S. or some other economy. These models are intended to be structural (i.e., policy invariant) and in some cases this attempt is enhanced by a modelling strategy that features explicit optimization by individual agents acting in a dynamic and stochastic environment.
To study effects of policy behavior, stochastic simulations are conducted using the model at hand with alternative policy rules, with summary statistics being calculated to represent performance in terms of average values of the variability of inflation, the output gap, and interest rates. A few of the models are constructed so that each simulation implies a utility level for the representative individual agent; in such cases, utility-based performance measures can be calculated. In several studies, effort is taken to make the policy rules operational, which with an interest instrument means a realistic specification of information available to the central bank when setting its instrument.
In discussing in more detail the components of this framework it will be useful to have an algebraic representation of a simple special case. Here I will use y t to denote the natural logarithm of real GDP during quarter t, with y t being the "capacity" or "potential" or "natural rate" value of y t . Then ỹ t = y t -y t is the output gap. Also p t is the log of the price level so ∆p t is the inflation rate while g t represents real government purchases and R t is the level of the short-term nominal interest rate used as the central bank's instrument.
(1)
Here E t z t+j is the rationally-formed expectation at time t of the value of z that will prevail in period t+j, so E t ∆p t+1 is the expected inflation rate and R t -E t ∆p t+1 is the one-period real rate of interest. The terms v t , u t , and e t represent random disturbance factors that impinge on the choices of individuals and the central bank; these are not observable to an econometrician. The parameters designated β, α, and µ do not change with time, unlike the variables that carry the subscript t. All parameters except β 2 are presumed to be positive.
Relation (1) attention from the press and practical commentators, for the latter class implies that an increasing inflation rate will keep output high forever (in contrast to either of the mentioned versions of (2)). That the press-and even some professional publications 9 --fail to distinguish between the NRH and the NAIRU concept is in my opinion slightly 4 These authors include Kerr and King (1996) , McCallum and Nelson (1999), and Woodford (1995) . 5 The references are Calvo (1983) and Rotemberg (1982) . 6 It can be easily verified that (2) implies that if policy generates inflation such that E(∆p t -∆p t-1 ) ≠ 0, then E(y t -y t ) ≠ 0.
7 One of the few relations with price stickiness that satisfies the NRH is my own favorite, the P-bar model used by McCallum and Nelson (1998) . Its weakness is that it does not yield as much persistence in inflation as appears in the data. 8 Typified by ∆p t = α 1 ∆p t-1 + (1-α 1 )∆p t-2 + α 2 (y t -y ) + u t .
9 See, e.g., the symposium in the Winter 1997 issue of the Journal of Economic Perspectives.
disgraceful, especially since the very term "NAIRU" suggests an incompatibility with the NRH.
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The third component of this simple system is the monetary policy rule (3). It suggests that with µ 1 and µ 2 positive the central bank will raise R t , thereby tightening policy, when inflation exceeds its target value π * and/or when output is high relative to capacity. Thus (3) has here been written in approximately the form suggested by Taylor (1993) , which has come to be known as "the Taylor rule." I will have quite a bit to say about that rule below, but for the moment I wish to take up the point that the system (1)-(3) does not include a money demand function. Indeed, it does not refer to any monetary quantity measure in any way whatsoever. To anyone steeped in the tradition of Homer
Jones, this strikes a rather dissonant note. So let's take a minute to consider whether it is sensible.
To do that, suppose that we add to the system a standard money demand function.
Let m t be the log of the money stock, either the monetary base or M1 depending on whether or not a banking sector behavior is included. Then we have (4) m t -p t = γ 0 + γ 1 y t + γ 2 R t + ε t where ε t is the random component of money demand. Here y t is a proxy measure of the transactions that money facilitates and R t is an (overly simple) measure of the opportunity cost of holding money rather than some other asset. In an actual application some account might have to be taken of technical progress in the payments process, but for present purposes that complication is unnecessary. The first basic point to be made is that if we append (4) to the system (1) -(3), it plays no essential role. It merely determines how much money has to be supplied by the central bank in order to implement its interest rate policy rule (3). The system (1)-(3) determines the same values for ∆p t , y t , and R t whether (4) is recognized or not, presuming that y t and g t are exogenously given. This is the basic point that has led many researchers to ignore money and, indeed, that has led the staff of the Fed's Board of Governors to construct a large, sophisticated, and expensive new macroeconometric model that does not recognize money in any capacity. 11 But is the point valid?
Evidently there are at least two requirements for it to be valid. First is that the central bank of the economy being modelled actually conducts policy by manipulating a real-world counterpart of R t while paying no decisive attention to current movements in m t . It is widely agreed that this is in fact the case for the United States and most other industrialized nations, including Germany. 12 Second, it must be the case that m t does not appear in correctly-specified versions of either (1) or (2). With respect to the latter that condition would seem to be satisfied, but for the expectational IS function (1) it is more problematical. What is required in a mainstream theoretical analysis 13 is that the transaction-cost function, which describes the way that money (the medium of exchange)
facilitates transactions, must be separable in m t and the spending variable such as y t . But there is no theoretical reason for that to be the case and it clearly is not the case for my own preferred specification. So what is actually being assumed implicitly, by analyses that exclude m t (i.e., m t -p t ) from the relation (1), is that the effects of money holdings on spending are quantitatively small (indeed negligible). This is a belief with a long and y t -y t , in immediate contradiction to the NRH.
11 See Brayton, et. al. (1997) . 12 On this point, see Clarida and Gertler (1996) . 13 Such as that of Walsh (1998) or McCallum and Goodfriend (1987) .
tradition, and I am inclined to think that it is probably justifiable, but the whole matter needs additional study.
One of the fortuitous events that led to today's era of cooperation between central-bank and academic economists was the publication of a 1993 paper by John Taylor-the one in which he explicitly proposed the now-famous Taylor rule. By writing his rule in terms of the instrument actually used by central banks and expressing his formula with brilliant simplicity, Taylor made the concept of a monetary rule more palatable to central bankers-especially as he showed that recent U.S. experience had in fact conformed to his formula rather closely. 14 Simultaneously, the step was attractive to academics because it enabled them both to simplify their analysis, by discarding money demand functions, and also to be more realistic.
The precise rule proposed by Taylor (1993) for the U.S. economy is as follows:
(5) R t = ∆p t a + 0.5 (∆p t a -π * ) + 0.5 ỹ t + r .
Here ∆p t a is the average inflation rate over the past four quarters-a proxy for expected inflation-and ỹ t is y t -y t , the output gap. For r , the average real rate of interest, Taylor assumed 2 percent (per year) and for the inflation target π * he also assumed 2 percent. So he actually wrote the expression, with p denoting inflation, y denoting ỹ , and r instead of R, as follows: r = p + 0.5y + 0.5(p -2) + 2. In thinking about this rule, it is important to recognize that it does not involve the fallacy of using a nominal interest rate as an indicator of monetary tightness or ease. Rather it compares the real rate R t∆p t a with its long-run equilibrium value r and adjusts the former upward if the current situation, represented by 0.5 (∆p t a -π * ) + 0.5 ỹ t , calls for a tighter stance.
To illustrate the workings of the Taylor rule we can look at a diagram, similar to one recently constructed by Taylor (1999) Taylor's for looser. Since that was a period during which U.K. inflation rose rather rapidly-after having been temporarily subdued by the onslaught of Margaret Thatcherthis episode is one that can be pointed out, when I want to argue the merits of my rule.
I must also say that it would be very wrong to interpret this contrast of rules as representing a dispute between Taylor and me. I believe that the two of us are striving for basically the same policy goals-a stable, rule-like monetary policy designed to keep inflation low and to do what little it can to stabilize real output fluctuations. Furthermore, I am confident that he shares this belief. And I certainly have no hesitation in saying that he has been the more effective spokesman for our cause. 15 The target value ∆x* equals the desired average rate of inflation plus the expected long-run average rate of growth of real output-say, 2.0 + 2.5 = 4.5 percent per year (or 0.01125 in quarterly fractional units). Then the rule is ∆b t = ∆x* -∆v a t + 0.5(x* t-1 -x t-1 ) where b t and x t are logs of the base and nominal GDP That said, in closing I would like to apply our two rules to the extremely important case of Japan in the 1990s. To do so with the Taylor rule requires us to adopt values for π * and r , the inflation target and the long-run average real interest rate. For the former I will again take 2 percent in measured terms (which probably overstates the actual inflation rate in Japan by about 1 percent). For r , Taylor's (1993) procedure was to use a number close to the long-run average rate of output growth. This is hard to judge in Japan at present but I will use 3 percent, since output grew at a rate of 4 percent over Figure 3 . Here, when the solid rulesuggested values are greater than the dotted actual values for base growth, the indication is that policy should have been looser. Thus we see that this rule agrees with Taylor's regarding 1972 Taylor's regarding -1978 Taylor's regarding and 1979 Taylor's regarding -1985 . But it suggests that policy was too loose on average over 1986-1989 (when U.S. policymakers were encouraging a weaker yen).
Most notably, Figure prominently, the written contributions of Goodfriend (1997) and Taylor (1997) 19 In fact I did, although in a less effective way, in McCallum (1993) and McCallum and Hargraves (1995) . The story was the same as in Figure 3 . 
